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NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENTS IN EQUITY.
Where there is direct conflict of opinion between the courts of
different States on a question of practical importance in the busi-
ness world, it may well be worth while to state the question and
to give the reasons assigned on both sides and endeavor to come
to a conclusion as to which side should prevail. There is such
a difference of opinion on a question which arises very frequently
in dealing with the equitable title acquired by an assignment of
funds in the hands of executors and trustees or of moneys due
from a debtor to a creditor.
The question is whether an assignee for value without notice
who gives notice to the debtor or trustee obtains priority over a
prior assignee who has not given notice, or whether the assign-
ment prior in time is prior in right even though the earlier
assignee has given no notice to the debtor or trustee.
In the United States there are decisions on both sides of the
question. In England, the rule is that which was adopted in
Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ., i (1827), that if one takes an assignment
of a fund in the hands of a trustee and neglects to give notice to
the holder of the fund, a second assignee for value who has no
intimation of the prior assignment and has himself given notice to
the holder of the fund, will have priority. This rule has been
adopted by the Federal courts in the United States and by the
courts of some of the States, but it has been ignored or rejected
by the courts of other States, and they have applied the maxim
qui prior in tempore potior in jure, and have held that the prior
assignment must prevail even though no notice was given to the
trustee and the second assignee take his assignment for value
and without notice.
In the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law the
situation of the law in England and America is stated as follows:
"It is a well established rule in England that as between suc-
cessive assignees of a chose in action, he will have the prefer-
ence who first gives notice to the debtor, even if he be a sub-
sequent assignee, provided that at the time of taking it, he had
no notice of the prior assignments. In this country the authori-
ties are greatly at variance on the question. In the Federal courts
and many of the State courts the English rule has been adopted;
but in other States the doctrine is denied and it is held that the
assignment of a chose in action is complete upon the mutual
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assent of the assignor and the assignee and does not gain addi-
tional validity as against subsequent assignees by notice to the
debtor." 1
In the Cyclopaedia of Law and Procedure it is said:
"The general rule is that as between successive assignees of
the same chose in action from the same assignor, the assignee
prior in point of time is prior in point of right, even though he
has failed to give notice of the assignment to the debtor, and a
subsequent assignee, who took without notice of the prior assign-
ment, has given notice to the debtor of the assignment to him,
although the courts of the United States and some of the States
hold to the contrary view." 2
In both of these compilations of the law, the rule is stated as
a rule of property governing the assignment of choses in action
generally, as if it applied to notes and bonds and other papers
which are themselves obligations. The question is treated as a
question of the title to a chose in action rather than as a question
as to how a court of equity shall deal with persons acquiring
the title in certain circumstances to equitable property of a cer-
tain kind, and it is perhaps because the distinction has not been
observed in some cases that there is a contrariety of opinion in
the American cases.
- The rule of property, both at law and in equity, undoubtedly
is that the holder who is prior in time is also prior in right, and,
whether the assignment of a chose in action gives a legal title
or merely a title in equity, this is the rule that must ordinarily
govern the title to the property thus acquired. Since choses in
action have been made assignable at law it is not always easy
to determine whether the title acquired by an assignment of a
1 2 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1077. 2nd ed. i896. The cases cited are
the following: Federal courts: Spain v. Hamilton's extrs, i Wall., 623;
Iudson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 612; Laclede Bank v. Schuler, I2o U. S.,
511. States adopting the English rule: Bank v. Hewitt, 3 Iowa, 93,
66 Am. Dec., 49; Murdoch v. Finney, 21 Mo., 136; Smith v. Sterrtt, 24 Mo.,
26o; Ward v. Morrison, 25 Vt., 593; Switzer v. Noffsinger, 83 Va., 518.
States rejecting the English rule: Kennedy v. Parke, 17 N. J. Eq., 415;
Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 228, 38 Am. Dec., 633; Hopkins v.
Bank, 7 Cow., 65o; Fairbanks v. Sargent, io4 N. Y., io8, 56 Am. Rep., 490;
Brander v. Young, 12 Tex., 332.
24 Cyc., 77. Note 82. The authorities cited for the doctrine stated in
the text are cases in Alabama, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and
West Virginia. The American authorities cited as following the English
rule are cases in the United States courts and in Iowa and Missouri.
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chose in action is legal or equitable, and in some of the States in
which the question we are considering was first decided, it was
not necessary in the procedure of the court to distinguish very
sharply between legal and equitable titles.
In some of these decisions the courts have regarded the ques-
tion as a question of the title to the thing assigned as between
assignor and assignee, rather than as a question of the principle
to be applied by courts of equity to dealings in equitable interests
between successive assignees.
In Massachusetts, the question arose with respect to the rights
of a judgment creditor under an attachment of a debt that had
been assigned without notice to the debtor. In Wood v. Part-
ridge, ii Mass., 488, it was held that want of notice to the debtor
would not defeat the interest of the assignee as against an attach-
ing creditor of the assignor, and afterwards in Thayer v. Daniels,
113 Mass., 129, it was held upon a creditors' bill that an assign-
ment of a chose in action was good against the attaching credi-
tor of the assignor, although the assignee had not given notice to
the debtor. In this case Devens, J., referred to Dearle v. Hall
and said:
"The rule in England seems to be that as between successive
purchasers of a chose in action, he will have preference who
first gives notice to the debtor, even if he be a subsequent pur-
chaser. * * * Such, however, has not been the rule adopted
in this State where it is well settled that the assignment of a
chose in action is complete upon the mutual assent of the assignor
and the assignee and does not gain additional validity by notice to
the debtor. The principle which must govern in the trustee pro-
cess, must determine the case upon this point." 3
In a later case in MassachusettsY the question arose between
successive assignees of a fund in the hands of a trustee under a
will. The first assignee had given no notice to the trustee and
the assignment had not been recorded and the second assignee
had given notice and recorded his assignment. The case was
very similar to Dearle v. Hall, but the Supreme Judicial Court
did not consider the question of equity discussed in that case, but
applied the rule declared in Thayer v. Daniels with respect to
the title to choses in action and said:
"Their respective interests were mere choses in action and it
is settled in this Commonwealth that in the absence of fraud, an
8 Citing Wakefield v. Martin, 3 Mass., 558; Dix v. Cobb 4 Mass.,
So8; Wood v. Partridge, xi Mass., 448.
' Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass., 205.
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assignment of a chose in action is good against a subsequent
purchaser though not recorded and though 'no notice is given to
the debtor."
And it was held that an assignment by the beneficiary of a
trust of his interest in the trust fund, although it was unrecorded
and no notice was given to the persons in charge of the fund,
took precedence over a subsequent assignment for value without
notice which was recorded and of which notice was given.
In New York the rule established is in accordance with that of
Massachusetts, and it is interesting to observe that it had its
origin in like manner as a rule of property rather than in the
application of principles of equity.
The leading case in New York was an action of debt on a
bond,5 and the decision was that the first assignee of a bond was
entitled to recover the last installment, even though a later
assignee had given the first notice, but the recovery was only
sought of an installment which came due after notice given by
the first assignee. Judge Cowen said that as between the two
assignees of the bond, the first was entitled to the money. In a
conflict of equitable claims, the rule is the same as at law, qui
prior est tempore, potior est jure, and the first assignee was al-
lowed to recover against the obligee of the bond the money he
had paid over to the second assignee after receiving notice of
the first one. Judge Cowen referred to the question suggested by
Chancellor Kent in Murray v. Lylburn, 12 Johns Chy., 441-443,
whether the case of Redfearn v. Ferrier, i Dow Parl. Cases 50,
might not be regarded as a qualification of Lord Thurlow's re-
marks in Davis v. Austin, i Ves. Jr., 249, where he said: "A
purchaser of a chose in action must always abide by the case of
the person from whom he buys." On the question whether
notice should be required to complete the title of an assignee.
Judge Cowen said:
"Ordinarily any notice to conventional assignees must be out
of the question, for the first assignee cannot know who they will
be. Notice to the debtor might, I admit, afford them a better
chance, for then there would be someone of whom they. might
inquire and they would naturally inquire. This might prevent
fraud and to require it would perhaps be very proper. It is re-
quired by the law of Scotland, as appears by Redfearn v. Ferrier,
which was decided by Scotch law. By that law, there must be
what is called an intimation to the debtor before the assignment
5 Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 228 (1842).
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is perfect and secures a complete preference even as against a
subsequent assignee."
Judge Cowen, however, distinguished Murray v. Lylburn as
a case in which there was a mere equity and not an express
assignment. He said he considered the notice as intended for the
protection of the debtor alone. He referred to the Massachu-
setts cases6 in which it was held that as between assignor and
assignee an assignment is complete without notice to the debtor
and that such an assignment was good as against attaching credi-
tors. And he cited cases in Kentucky' and quoted Hall, J., in
Jordan v. Black,8 as saying in substance that upon an examination
of the authorities it would be found that the ground taken by the
assignee of being a bona fide purchaser is tenable by those per-
sons only who have the legal title in them and plead that they
are purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice. The
suit was an action on a bond and it was found that the debtor
had no defense with respect to so much as had been paid to the
second assignee after notice of the claim of the first. No de-
mand was made for the money which had been paid over before
such notice. The case of Dearle v. Hall was not considered and
the question was treated as a question of the equitable title to a
chose in action to which the doctrine of the defense of a bona
fide purchaser of the legal title for value without notice was not
applicable.
The doctrine of Muir v. Schenck was applied in Fairbanks v.
Sargent9 to the case of an assignment made to an attorney of
a certain share of what should be collected on an account in liti-
gation. The assignor afterwards assigned the account to another
who, having had no notice of the assignment to the attorney,
settled the case by taking bonds. It was held that the attorney
was entitled to his share of the bonds. Ryan, C. J., said: "One
assignee of such a claim from the owner (i. e., a claim witnessed
by no writing) must necessarily acquire the same interest as any
other assignee does, and that is, in the absence of controlling
equities, an interest subject to the rule that he who is prior in
point of time is prior in right." The decision was placed upon
6 Wood v. Partridge, ii Mass., 488; Foster v. Sinkler, 4 Mass., 450;
Bholen v. Cleveland, 5 Mason, 174-176; Dix v. Cobb, 4 Mass., 5o8.
7 White's Heirs v. Prentiss' Heirs, 3 Monroe, 510; Madeira v. Cattlett,
7 Id., 477.
slordan v. Black, 2 Murphy, 3o.
9 iO4 N. Y., ioS.
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the ground of priority of title, the title of both parties, whether
it was legal or equitable, having been derived from the same
source and it was considered that if there were equities they
should not control so as to disturb the natural order of priority..
In a later case the same rule was stated in a contest over the
priority of two assignments of the moneys due under a contract
with a city."0 The assignment was made a security for a smaller
sum and was considered as an assignment of a part of the fund
and .was therefore an equitable assignment. The Court said:
"Patten, as a matter of fact, makes no claim against the city.
* * * * He comes within the rule laid down by this Court
to the effect that as between different assignees of a chose in
action by express assignment from the same person, the one prior
in point of time will be protected although he has given no notice
of such assignment to either the subsequent assignee or the
debtor." A different rule exists in England, in some of the
States and in the United States courts. The respondents coun-
sel has cited many of these foreign cases that are contrary to the
law as long established in this State."' 2
The courts of many other States have reached the same con-
clusion as those of New York and Massachusetts, and have fol-
lowed the same line of reasoning, and in doing so they have
stated that a different rule has been adopted in England and in
our Federal and some of our State courts. The cases are col-
lected in a note in the fourth volume of the Cyclopaedia of Law
and Procedure, 4 Cyc., p. 77, Note 82, and there are abstracts
of them in 4 Century Digest, Assignments, Pars. 149 and 15o, and
still later cases may be found by reference to the Annotations for
1909.
One of these later cases is Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v.
First National Bank, 25 Ky. Law Rep., 561, 76 S. W. Rep., 156
(19o3). The Court said:
"The rights of the trust company are not affected by reason
of the fact that the bank first gave notice to the debtor of its
assignments. The rule in England is that as between successive
assignees of the same chose, each being a bona fide purchaser for
value, the one who first gave notice to the debtor will be entitled
to a preference, although his assignment is later in date. Some
10 Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y., 277, 41 N. E. Rep., 572.
"Fairbanks v. Sargent, 1O4 N. Y., io8; Williams v. Ingersoll, 117
N. Y., 5o8; Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 228.
22 There are later cases in New York in which the same rule is laid
down, e. g., Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N. Y., 546, 57 N. E. Rep., 184; Central
Trust Co. v. West India Impr. Co., 169 N. Y., 314, 62 N. E. Rep., 387.
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courts of this country have adopted the same rule, but the weight
of authority is to the effect among successive assignments, the
order of time prevails." 13
It is to be observed, however, that Mr. Pomeroy, while stating
the two rules does not say which is sustained by the weight of
authority, and in paragraph 693, after stating the reasons given
for the English rule, he says: "Courts of the highest ability have,
therefore, regarded such assignments as occupying a very special
position, and have applied to them a special rule in determining
their order of priority."
There is an early case in New Jersey which is often cited in
support of the rule adopted in New York and Massachusetts.
This is Kennedy v. Parke, 17 N. J. Eq., 415 (1864). It was a
suit for a legacy in a probate court. The executor had paid the
legacy to an assignee and the ordinary, Chancellor Green, held
him liable to pay it again to a prior assignee who had given no
notice of the assignment. He said the right to a legacy was an
equitable right and that after the assignment, no interest, whether
legal or equitable, remained that could have passed to a second
assignee, and that it was difficult to see how a payment to him
could constitute a defense to the action. "It would seem," said
he, "that if the executors have any defense upon this ground, it
is purely an equitable defense and available only in a court of
equity." Here again the question was purely a question of title
and equitable principles were neither invoked nor applied. It is
now completely established in New Jersey and everywhere else
that if, without notice, the depositary or trustee pay the assignor,
such payment is a complete defense against an action by the
assignee. 14
In a recent case in New Jersey, Vice-Chancellor Garrison said:
"The English doctrine has been discarded in certain jurisdictions
in this country, including New York and New Jersey." 15
The New Jersey cases cited were: Kennedy v. Parke, 17 N.
J. Eq., 415; Kamena v. Huelbig, 23 N. J. Eq., 78; Terney v. Wil-
son, 45 N. J. Law, 282; Board of Education v. Duparquet, 5o N.
J. Eq., 234. Kennedy v. Parke has already been examined. The
next case involved the assignment of a bond and mortgage which
is Citing 2 Por. Eq., Par. 695; 4 Cyc., 32, 77.
14 Board of Ed. v. Duparquet, 50 N. J. Eq., 234-242; Miller v. Stock-
ton, 64 N. J. Law, 614-622; 2 Spence, Eq. fur., 858; 4 Cyc., 89.15 Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq., 358-372.
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were delivered to the assignee. In such a case there was no negli-
gence in not giving notice to the obligor, and the rule in Dearle v.
Hall is never applied to assignments of mortgages nor to any
liens on land. The third case was not a case of the equities of
successive assignees of the same debt, but of the right of a
debtor to set off against an assignee who had given no notice a
counter claim which the debtor had acquired against the original
creditor. In the last of these cases, Vice-Chancellor Pitney
examined the English rule as declared in Dearle v. Hall and
stated in Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. II, par. 850, and
said it arose out of the peculiar provision of the English Bankrupt
Act by which personal property and choses in action in the pos-
session of the bankrupt by the permission of- the true owner
passed to his assignees, by reason of which it was held that
assignees must do all in their power to reduce the thing assigned
into their possession in order to prevent it passing to the assignee
in bankruptcy. This, he says, led to the practice of giving notice
and to the habit of making inquiry of the debtor before taking an
assignment of choses in action. "The effect of this practice,"
he said, "was that the courts held that the party who bought
without notice of a previous assignment and after inquiring of
the debtor or depositary, got a better title than a prior assignor
who had not taken the precaution to give notice. Thus giving
notice to the debtor or depositary came to take the place of a
public registry of the assignment. This is illustrated by the cases
of Dearle v. Hall and Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ., i."
The vice-chancellor discussed these cases in detail and said:
"The result is that the whole value of notice to the debtor or de-
positary of the assignment of the fund or chose in action is, first,
under the English bankrupt law, to prevent the subject of the
assignment being considered as in 'the possession of or. under
the order of disposition of the assignor; and, second, to prevent
the debtor, depositary or trustee or innocent third parties, from
dealing with the original assignor or beneficiary." The vice-
chancellor thus stated clearly the origin and purpose and effect
of the English rule. The case did not involve the rights oi inno-
cent third parties, and his decision was that our attachment act
was not like the English bankrupt law and that an attaching
creditor was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
and had no better title than the debtor himself had.
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It has not been decided or even suggested, except in the
dictum of Vice-Chancellor Garrison, above referred to, that the
English rule with regard to the effect of failure to give notice or
the rights of successive assignees, has been discarded in New
Jersey. On the contrary, all the cases in New Jersey on equitable
assignments recognize the necessity of giving notice to the debtor
or trustee in order to make the assignment effective in certain
cases, and it is only when the question has been between the
assignee and the assignor and those who stand in his shoes that
the assignment has been held to be effective without it.is The
Court of Errors and Appeals in reversing the judgment in Cogan
v. Conover Mfg. Co., said: "As between the assignor and
assignee and those standing in the shoes of the assignor, notice
to the debtor or holder of the fund is not necessary. (Citing
English authorities.) Cases in which notice to the debtor or
holder of the fund becomes important are cases where the ques-
tion is one of priority between different assignees, as in Love-
ridge v. Cooper and Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ., i, and cases arising
under the English Bankruptcy Acts, Ryall v. Rowles, 2 L. C. Eq.,
1533."
In Miller v. Stockton, 64 N. J. Law, 614, 622, the Court of
Errors of New Jersey said:
"Whilst the notice is not an essential part of the assignment,
yet its office and value is to prevent the debtor, depositary or trus-
tee and innocent third parties from dealing with the original as-
signor as still the creditor, owner or beneficiary. If, without such
notice, he pays the amount to the assignor, he must in law be
relieved from its payment to the assignee, and payment to the
assignor would be a complete defense to an action by the
assignee. Board of Education v. Duparquet, 5o N. J. Eq., 234;
2 Spence, Eq. fur., 856, et. seq."
There is no doubt that it is the established rule, applicable to
equitable interests as well as to legal titles, that in the absence of
controlling equities the title that is prior in time must prevail. It
is also well settled that an equitable assignment as well as a legal
assignment of a debt is complete as between the assignee and the
assignor, although no notice of the assignment be given to the
debtor or trustee. It is generally agreed that if no notice of an
is Heath v. Supt. of Public Schools, 15 N. J. Eq., 22; Burnett v.
Jersey City, 31 N. J. Eq., 341; Kirtland v. Moore, 40 N. J. Eq., xo6; Bank
of Harlem v. Bayonne, 48 N. J. Eq., 246, S. C., on appeal, 318; Bd. of
Education v. Duparquet, 50 N. J. Eq., 234; Fisher v. Bull, 52 N. J. Eq.,
298; Miller v. Stockton, 64 N. J. Law, 614, 622.
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assignment be given to the debtor, the assignment is not com-
plete as against him, and he may safely pay a second assignee.
7
The only question is whether the rule shall be applied also to
the protection of a second assignee who is an innocent purchaser
without notice from the debtor or depositary, especially if he has
made inquiry of the debtor with regard to his knowledge of a
prior assignment.
It is this question that has .been answered in the affirmative in
Dearle v. Hall, and the English and American cases in which the
rule adopted in England in 1827 has been followed. The de-
cision was not put upon the doctrine of the rights of a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice. This, as Prof. Pomeroy says,
18
is not a rule of property but a rule of inaction, and applies only
when a defendant having a not inferior equity has acquired also
a legal title or an equitable title which is regarded in equity as
equivalent to a legal title. The rule in Dearle v. Hall rests upon
the ground that in view of the nature of the property acquired by
an equitable assignment of a chose in action, it is incumbent
upon the holder of it to do what he can to reduce it to possession
and to make good his title, so that the assignor may not deal with
it as if he owned it to the injury of subsequent purchasers.
Dearle v. Hall and Loveridge v. Copper, 3 Russ., i, were de-
cided by Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the Rolls, in 1827, and
the decision was affirmed by Lord Lyndhurst. A person having
a beneficial interest in a fund in the hands of trustees made an
assignment for value to one who gave no notice to the trustees,
and afterwards another, having made inquiry of the trustees,
took an assignment of the same fund for value and gave the
trustees notice. It was held that the second assignee had the
better title. Lord Lyndhurst after remarking that there was no
precise authority in point except the unreported case of Wright v.
Dorchester, sa said: "But the case is not new in principle. Where
personal property is assigned, delivery is necessary to complete
the transaction not as between vendor and vendee, but as to third
persons in order that they may not be deceived by the apparent
possession and ownership remaining in a person who is not in
fact the owner," and he referred to Ryall v. Rowles, i Ves.,
174 Cyc-, 89.
183 Porn., Eq. fur., Sect. 743.
18a This case has now been reported in the notes to Dearle v. Hall,
38 English Reports, Full Reprint, 496.
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348, 1 Atk., 165, which he conceded was a case in bankruptcy;
but he said the Lord Chancellor called to his assistance Lord
Chief Justice Lee and Lord Chief Baron Parker, "so that the prin-
ciple the court then acted upon must be considered to have re-
ceived the most authoritative sanction." And after quoting from
the judgment of Lord Chief Baron Parker, he said: "I cite these
authorities to show that in assignments of choses in action, notice
to the legal holder has been deemed necessary."
It is true that the decision was based upon the prior decisions
under the bankrupt law and, as Vice-Chancellor Pitney has sug-
gested, upon the fact that it came to be regarded under that act
as negligent not to give notice to the debtor, but nevertheless the
rule was deliberately adopted by the court of equity for safety in
dealing with a species of property which the court itself had
created and which was peculiarly subject to mistise unless pre-
cautions were taken to require something to be done to reduce it'
to possession in order to retain the title as against innocent
purchasers.
The doctrine of Dearle v. Hall was reviewed by the House of
Lords and approved and applied in Foster v. Cockerell, 3 Clark
& Finnelly, 456 (1835). This was a case of a second incum-
brancer of an equitable interest who had given notice to the
trustees and it was held that he had obtained priority over a
prior encumbrancer who had not given notice. Lord Lyndhurst,
in moving the judgment of the House of Lords, stated the prin-
ciples upon which Sir Thomas Plumer had based his conclusions
and said he entirely agreed with them and that the principles
were directly applicable to the case in hand. Lord Brougham
concurred in this opinion and the House of Lords gave judgment
accordingly.
The rule of Dearle v. Hall was followed and explained by Sir
James Wigram, V.C., in Meux v. Ball, i Hare, 73 (184), and
the principle was applied to a case in which the second encum-
brancer had made no inquiry of the trustee. The vice-chancellor
said the reasoning of Sir Thomas Plumer had been affirmed by
the House of Lords in a case where no inquiry had been made
by the second encumbrancer, and he had been preferred to the
first who had failed to give notice to the trustee, and the de-
cision was put on the ground that the first encumbrancer had
not perfected his security. He said: "I think these decisions
are founded on principle. The omission of the puisne encum-
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brancer to make inquiry cannot be material where inquiry into
the circumstances of the case would not have led to a knowledge
of the prior encumbrance."
Dearle v. Hall was distinguished from McCreight v. Foster,
5 Ch. App., 604 (1870), where there was merely a contract to
assign and not a complete assignment and also in Ex parte Rob-
bidge, 8 Ch. D., 367. It was followed and applied by Sir George
Jessel, M.R., in In re Freshfield's Trusts, ii Ch. D., 198 (1879),
and the judgment was affirmed by Lord Selborne, and Baggallay
and Lush, L., JJ.
In a recent case in the King's Bench Division, in bankruptcy,
it was held that the doctrine was not limited to a case where there
was laches in not giving notice. Wright, J., after quoting Lord
Lyndhurst in Foster v. Cockerell, said:
"According to that authority the rule that prefers an assignee
who has given the prior notice does not depend solely on the im-
putatioi of laches and even in the absence of laches the other
grounds for the rule exist. Nor, I think, has the question ever
been treated as one merely of laches. The courts seem to me to
have in modern times asked only which assignee was the first
to perfect his security by notice." 11
In Montefore v. Guedalla [1903] 2 Ch., 37, Cozzens-I-ardy,
J., said:
"The rule laid down in Dearle v. Hall is now part of the law of
the land. It does not rest merely upon the decision of Sir Thomas
Plumer and Lord Lyndhurst in that case. It was affirmed and
possibly extended by the House of Lords in Foster v. Cockerell.
The reasoning of Jessel, M.R., in In re Freshfield Trusts has
satisfied me that the principle applies equally when the second
assignment is made not by the original owner who made the first
assignment, but by his legal representative. That decision is
nearly a quarter of a century old. It has never been questioned."
The rule of Dearle v. Hall is stated by Mr. Spence in his
treatise on The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery,
as an established rule of the court of equity in dealing with suc-
cessive assignees or encumbrancers of debts or funds in the hands
of trustees,2" and by Judge Story in his work on Equity Juris-
prudence, in 1857.1
19 In re Lake; Ex parte Cavendish [19o3] i K. B., 151.
2Q The case is stated and the rule explained and defined in White
v. Tudor's note to Ryall v. Rowles, 2 Leading Cases in Equity, p. 849.
212 Story, Eq., Par. 1035. See also Par. 1057 and i Story, Eq., Par.
421. A later edition gives a reference to the American cases holding a
contrary doctrine. Ibid, Par. 421 (c).
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The English rule is stated in Pomeroy's Equity with the rea-
sons on which it is based, and he says: "Courts of the highest
ability have, therefore, regarded such assignments as occupying
a very special position and have applied to them a special rule in
determining their order of priority." These reasons, he says, do
not apply as between the assignor and the assignee, or even his
judgment creditors.2 2 Prof. Pomeroy states also the contrary
rule adopted by many of the American courts. Dearle v. Hall
is included in the collection of English Ruling Cases, Vol. X, p.
478, and the rule is there stated briefly as follows: "Where A,
having a beneficial interest, present or future, by a right avail-
able against B assigns his interest to C, and subsequently assigns
the same interest to D, if before B has received any intimation
of the assignment to C, D gives notice to B of the assignment to
him, D has a better equity than C." In the American note it is
said: "There is some dispute about the doctrine of the rule in
this country and reference is made to some cases. on both sides
of the question." 28
The English rule was approved and followed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 612
(1854), where Catron, J:, said: "The rule was distinctly asserted
by Chancellor Kent in 1817, in Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch.,
442, before the question was settled in England and before this
court discussed it which was in 1822 (Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7
Wheat., 46), and the same principle was applied by the Court of
Appeals of Virginia in the case of Moore v. Holcombe, 3 Leigh's
R., 597, in 1832."
This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Spain v.
Hamilton's Administrator, i Wall., 6o4 (1863). Mr. Justice
Wayne said:
"This case has been examined by us very fully and with every
regard for the arguments of the able counsel representing the
complainant (Messrs. Brent and Bradley). We think it to be
clearly within the principles decided by this court in Judson v.
Corcoran. It is clearly within the cases which have been so fully
and ably reported, of Dearle v. Hall and Loveridge v. Cooper, in
3 Russ., i. * * * As the assignee is generally entitled to all
the remedies of the assignor, so he is subject to all the equities
between the assignor and his debtor. But in order to perfect his
222 Pom., Eq., Pars. 893, 894.
23 There is a note upon Dearie v. Hall in i Ames, Cases on Trusts,
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title against his debtor, it is indispensable that the assignee should
give immediate notice of the assignment to the debtor, for other-
wise a priority of right may be obtained by a subsequent assignee
or the debt may be discharged by a payment to the assignee be-
fore such notice. (2 Story, Eq. Jur., 376, Par. io47, and the
cases cited.) No cases can be cited or were in conflict with those
upon which we rely for the judgment we are about to give in this
case."
The judgment was in favor of the second assignee who made
inquiries and gave notice against the first assignee who had had
no notice.
This decision was quoted in Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 120 U. S.,
511 (1886), but the question in that case related to a draft upon
a bank, and such also was the question in Christmas v. Russell.
14 Wall., 69.24
The English rule has been adopted by the courts of Cali-
fornia,25, Connecticut," Iowa,27 Mississippi,28 Missouri
2 9 Penn-
sylvania,8 0 Tennessee,3' Virginia,82 and Vermont,
82 and the prin-
ciple of the rule is fully recognized in New Jersey as shown in
the New Jersey cases above cited.
There is no need to refer to the cases in detail, but it may be
useful to quote a few of the recent cases. It is interesting to
note that in a case in Connecticut in 184I,
8' the rule was applied
even as against attaching creditors and that the court refused to
24 The rule in Dearle v. Hall was applied in Methven v. Staten Island
L. H. & P. Co., 66 Fed., 113 (C. C. A., S D. N. Y. I895), in the Elmbank
72 Fed., 61o (N. D. Cal. 1896) ; in Third National Bank of Philadelphia v.
Atlantic City, 126 Fed., 413 (C. C. N. J., 9o3), and in Jack v. National
Bank, i7 Okla., 430, 89 Pac., 219, overruling Gillette v. Murphy, 7 Okla., 91,
54 Pac., 413.
25 Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, I24 Cal., 127, 56 Pac., 627, 44 L.
R .A., 632.
26 Woodbridge v. Perkins, 3 Day, 364; Judah v. Judd, 5 Day, 534;
Bishop v. Holcomb, 2o Conn., 444; Van Buskirk v. Hartford Ins. Co., r4
Conn., 141, where the rule was applied even against attaching creditors;
Foster v. Mix, 20 Conn., 395.
27 Merchants' Bank v. Hewitt, 3 Iowa, 96; Manning v. Matthews, 70
Iowa, 503, 66 Am. Dec., 49.
2s Enoch-Havis Lumber Co. v. Newcomb, 79 Miss., 462, So. R., 6o8.
29 Murdoch v. Finney, 21 Mo., 138; Houser v. Richardson, go Mo.,
App., 134.
30 Re Phillips Estate, Appeal of Moses, 205 Pa. St., 515, 55 Atl., 213.
3' Nelson v. Trigg, 79 Tenn. (7 Lea.), 69.
32 Coffman v. Liggett, 107 Va., 418, 59 S. E. R., 392.
83 Ward v. Morrison, 25 Vt., 593.
34 Bishop v. Holcombe, 2o Conn., 141.
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credit the evidence offered to show that the law of New York
differed from that of England and Connecticut upon a principle
so "correct and salutary as that requiring notice to be given of
the assignment of a chose in action to protect it against the sub-
sequently acquired rights of other persons."
A recent case in California 5 applies the English rule to an
assignment of book accounts, noting the distinction mentioned by
Prof. Pomeroy between a subsequent purchaser for value and an
attaching or judgment creditor of the first assignee. The court
referred to the New York decisions and said they thought the
English rule followed by our Federal courts and some State
courts was "based upon the better reasons and sustained by the
weight of authority." Notice to the debtor not only protects the
assignee against payment to the assignor but against any payment
to the subsequent assignee.
In Pennsylvania after some uncertainty in the earlier de-
cisions, there was a case in 1903 in which choice was made be-
tween the two lines of conflicting American decisions, and pre-
ference was given to the English rule as affording the
greater safety in dealing with an important species of
equitable property.85a Judge Brown, speaking for the Supreme
Court, said that funds in the hands of trustees were dealt in
commercially by means of assignments and that it was important
that the dealings should be protected as far as possible. In-
quiry of the assignor would be of little avail, because if a man
would sell to one man what he had already sold to another, his
word was not to be relied upon. The trustee had no .interest and
would answer truly if inquired of. If notice were required by
law, notice would ordinarily be given, and assignments could be
taken with safety after inquiry of the trustee. He quoted the
words of Chief Justice Gibson in Fisher v. Knox, 13 Pa. St., 622,
53 Am. Dec., 5o3, as indicating how he would have decided the
question if it had come before him and said: "With the ques-
tion now fairly before us, we adopt and announce as the only
safe rule, that if an assignee fails to give notice to the person
holding the fund assigned to him, a subsequent assignee without
a Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, i24 Cal., 17, 56 Pac., 627, 44 L.
R. A., 629 (i8ri).
81sa In Re Phillips Estate, Appeal of Moses, 2o5 Pa. St., 5,5, 55 Adt.,
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notice of the former assignment, will, upon giving notice of his
assignment, acquire priority."
There can be no question of the policy of adopting such a
rule. It is a rule that works for justice and gives the value of
commercial availability to credit assets of enormous extent and
variety. A review of the cases shows that it has the authority
of English equity judges of the highest ability during three-quar-
ters of a century, and also of the Supreme Court of the United
States and other Federal courts and of the courts of many of the
States. The principles of equity upon which it rests are familiar.
It is conceded in most of the cases that as between the assignor
and the assignee, the title to a claim assigned is complete with-
out notice to the debtor or trustee, and that this is also true with
respect to those who stand in the shoes of the assignor as attach-
ing creditors or assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, apart from
the special provisions of the English statute; but as against sub-
sequent assignees for value without notice, it is required of an
assignee that he assert his control over the property by giving
notice to the person who holds it in trust or possession. In the
earlier decisions this was required by way of analogy to the
statutes against fraud in the transfer of personal property with-
out change of possession, and it was in fact the declaration of a
rule for enforcing honest dealing in equitable property. If no
notice were given, the property was not safe against assignees
under the English Bankruptcy Act, nor was it secure against a
payment by the trustee to the assignor or a subsequent assignee.
There was negligence, therefore, in not giving the notice and by
reason of this negligence the assignee who failed to give notice
was deferred to one who did. The doctrine of notice, as was
said by Garrison, J., in a case in the Court of Appeals of New
Jersey, 6 is at bottom a part of the law of negligence. So far
as title is concerned the equities of the two assignees may be
equal, but by reason of the negligence of the first assignee in
leaving the assignor with apparent ownership, the second assignee
who himself gives notice has the better equity. His equity is like
that of a subsequent encumbrancer without notice who takes
protection against a subsequent encumbrancer which a prior
36 Fisher v. Bull, 52 N. J. Eq., 298-3o9. The Judge adds: "It is un-
doubtedly true, as a general rule, that the assignee of a fund is negligent
if he fails to give notice to the depositary who may otherwise pay it out
to a subsequent assignee."
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encumbrancer has neglected to take."' Even though the
second assignee, being a bona fide holder for value, has not
a legal title, he has a title which the court of equity has created
and is desirous of protecting, and on this ground he is regarded
by analogy at least, as having the rights of a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice.38  The doctrine of estoppel also is in-
voked against the first assignee who has not given notice, and for
want of giving the notice he is not permitted to assert his claim
against one who parted with value relying upon the apparent title
of the assignor. He must himself have given notice, but according
to the English authorities, 9 it is not necessary that he should
have inquired of the trustee before purchasing if the inquiry
would not have revealed the prior purchase.
There are choses in action that do not come within the reasons
for the rule or the mischief that it is intended to guard against.
Such are negotiable and quasi-negotiable instruments, mortgages
on land, shares of stocks and debts which are transferable only
by possession of the document by which they are evidenced, but
apart from these it may be said that the rule of reason and sound
policy supported by the weight of authority is the rule declared
by Sir Thomas Plumer and approved by Lord Lyndhurst in
Dearle v. Hall. Edward Q. Keasbey.
Newark, N. I.
37 Foster v. Blackstone, i My. & K., 297; Etty v. Bridges, 2 Y. & C.
C. C., 486, 492.
88 An equitable mortgagee who advances his money on taking his
mortgage is regarded as a bona fide purchaser for value. Wheeler v.
Kirtland, 24 N. J. Eq., 553, 555.
39 Meux v. Bell, i Hare, 73; Etty v. Bridges, 2 Y. & C. C. C., 486-494;
Warburton v. Hill, i Kay, 470; Foster v. Blackstone, I My. & K., 297;
Foster v. Cockerell, 3 Cl. & Fin., 456, 9 Bligh., N. S., 332.
